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Abstract 
The monetary policy shocks have been widely regarded to have effects on the financial markets. Before the 
2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve adjusted the federal funds target rate to implement the monetary 
policy. This paper uses event studies to examine the relationship between the Federal Reserve's interest rate 
decisions and the asset prices. We find that treasury bills and exchange rates of the developed countries were 
significantly influenced by the FED's unexpected monetary policy shocks from the year of 1989 to 2008. 
However, in the same period, exchange rates of the emerging markets responded weakly to the policy sur-
prises. We also have observed that international equity markets and commodity prices were not sensitive to 
the rate decisions of the Federal Reserve. In addition, Treasury bill yields responded significantly to the 
anticipated and unanticipated rate decisions in both pre and post FOMC meeting days. We also show that 
the FED’s unexpected monetary policy had significant 5 day post announcement impacts on prices of almost 
all assets.  
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1. Introduction 
The interest rate decisions of central banks are very important events in financial markets. The movements 
of financial asset prices after monetary policy events especially interest the monetary policy makers, since 
financial markets are the reflections of real economies. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) once point out that 
financial markets are the immediate and direct transmission channels that link the monetary policy and real 
economic activities. The monetary authority, like the central bank, decides monetary policy, directs the fi-
nancial market through the implementation and expectation, and then influences the real economic activi-
ties, such as the output, the unemployment rate, and the price of goods and services. Since financial asset 
prices are the part of the price equilibrium through investments and financing behaviors, the study of asset 
price responses to the monetary policy is essential in understanding the transmission mechanism from cen-
tral bank's monetary policy to the real economy. Furthermore, market participants in the private sector, such 
as traders and portfolio managers from financial institutions, focus on how asset prices could response be-
fore and after the announcements or the implementation of the monetary policy, in order to make better bor-
rowing, lending and investment decisions. 
Monetary policy has been demonstrated to have both direct and indirect impacts on almost all asset classes 
through the adjustment of short term nominal interest rates, given that nominal interest rates are key varia-
bles in asset pricing and portfolio choice. The implementation of monetary policies, such as trading on 
treasury and federal agency securities, have the direct influence on the asset prices' behavior. In the U.S., the 
trading is implemented by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York through primary dealers, and then fol-
lowed by the change of interbank borrowing and lending and the fixed income arbitrage from the financial 
market participants. Previous researchers incorporate event studies to find that the monetary policy has indi-
rect influence on asset prices though signaling the market that the central bank will implement the monetary 
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policy in future periods. In international finance framework, due to the arbitrage between two countries2 
freely traded floating exchange rate movements are partly driven by interest rate differentials. This theoreti-
cal relationship can be derived from the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP) hypothesis where it predicts that 
high interest currency should depreciate against the low interest rate currency, because profits should be 
arbitraged away to zero3. 
This paper quantifies the market expectation of the monetary policy. By modeling the price data of forward 
looking Federal Fund Futures rate (FFR) which is traded at the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME), this 
paper decomposes the Federal Reserve Bank’s rate decision into the unexpected and expected components. 
Previous researchers have found that only the unexpected market news have impacts on asset prices. They 
give the reason that financial markets can assimilate financial information and learn to be at their “efficient” 
and “fair” value immediately, because a large number of market participants compete for the best prices4. 
This paper tries to estimate whether and how the Fed's interest rate decisions impact the U.S. asset prices 
such as treasury prices, U.S. equity prices, U.S. dollar exchange rates and so on. In addition, we also evalu-
ate the spillover effects of changes in the federal funds target rate on international equity and commodity 
prices. 
This paper is arranged by the following theme: Section I gives the introduction; Section II discusses the 
communication between the Federal Open Market Committee and market participants; Section III briefly 
investigates the previous related literatures; Section IV presents how we separate the monetary policy 
change into expected and unexpected parts, and introduces the regression model used in this paper; Section 
V summarizes the empirical data sets; Section VI discusses the results that how the asset prices respond to 
the monetary policy surprises on event days; Section VII models the effects in an 11 day event window and 
studies the responses on 11 event days, through which we can see the drift effects on asset prices of the 
change of monetary policy; Section VIII concludes.  
2. Evolution of Central Bank Communication 
Before February 1994, there was no public announcement from the Federal Open Market Committee 
(FOMC) regarding the Fed Fund Target Rate following a FOMC meeting. The financial market's behavior is 
based on the private sector's observation of the Open Market Operation5 which is executed by the trading 
desk of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. As the transparency increased, the unexpected part of the 
monetary policy change has been reduced to a lower level, which is consistent with one of the roles for the 
monetary policy: to sustain financial stability. The monetary authority reacted to outside economic random 
shocks, such as the spike and the drop of asset prices and financial crisis. Because the bubble and crisis are 
hard to predict, it is reasonable to expect that unexpected monetary policy will still reappear in the future, 
although the transparency between Fed and the public has been improved a lot by post-meeting announce-
ments and the FOMC minutes. Our study is still meaningful in revealing the economic behavior based on 
market expectation and efficiency. Table 2 lists the historic rate decisions by the Federal Reserve from 1989 
to 2008, which covers the period of monetary policy mystique (2/24/1989 to 9/4/1992), the period of Alan 
Greenspan lead policy reaction to the dot-com equity price bubble (11/16/1999 to 5/16/2000), and the period 
of the sub-prime mortgage crisis (9/18/2007 to 12/16/2008). Figure 1 presents the time series of the Fed 
Fund Target Rate and Figure 2 displays the historical rate decision. Figure 3 shows the sizes of the unex-
pected components of the policy changes, where we could observe that there were more unexpected rate 
decisions in the hidden period prior to 1994. We also could observe that there were less unexpected rate 
decisions but in greater sizes during the 2000 bubble and the 2007-08 financial crisis periods. The an-
                                                     
2 International fixed income arbitrage can be illustrated as a carry trade behavior. By borrowing money from low interest countries 
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the trading activity between the U.S. and Japan is very sensitive to the slight monetary policy between those two countries. For the 
carry trading, please read Burnside (2011), Daniel Hodrick and Lu(2014) and Jiang(2016). 
3 Regression work of UIP test and the theoretical argument, please read Chinn(2006) and Lothian and Wu(2011). UIP hypothesis is 
based on the non-arbitrage argument, which is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis and economics theory. 
4 The liquidity in the secondary markets are usually very good and efficient price discovery could be realized by trading activities. 
5 For more research about the transparency of monetary policy, please read: Goodfriend (1986), Yellen et al. (2012) and Wynne et 
al. (2013). 
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nouncements of the quantitative easing in the U.S. have been found to be significant in impacting domestic 
and international financial markets, the evidence of which is given by Joyce, Lasaosa, Stevens, Tong, et al. 
(2011); Glick and Leduc(2012); Wright(2012); Swanson and Williams(2014) and Fawley and Neely(2014). 
3. Literature review 
A large amount of papers examined the relationship between market nominal term structure of interest rates 
and monetary policy surprises. Since short term interest rates are considered to be the first transmission 
channel6 of monetary policy, a lot of researchers studied the nominal interest rates’ reaction to monetary 
policy expectation and implementation, spans from short term to long term, short horizon to long horizons. 
In addition, the story of Taylor rule tells us that the central bank mainly targeted short-term nominal interest 
rate in order to control the inflation rate and growth rate of an economy. However, the previous results are 
mixed. Dwyer and Hafer (1989) tested the unanticipated part of economic data releasing and its impact on 
nominal interest rate which are implied from mid-term and long term government bonds. They found that 
releasing of official government statistics has varied impacts on nominal bond interest rate over time by 
running rolling regression. Other people’s findings are also fruitful. Cook and Hahn (1989) found that Fed 
fund target rate increases are positively related to the T-bill rate (55 bps) and 30 years bond yield (10 bps).  
Edelberg, Marshall, et al. (1996) found a large, highly significant response of bill rates to policy shocks, but 
only a small, marginal significant response of bond rates. Kuttner (2001) used the Fed fund futures to gauge 
the size of the monetary policy and separated it into the expected and unexpected part. He found that short 
term interest rate only responds to the unexpected change of fed fund rate, but not to the expected change of 
target rate. Furthermore, long term interest rate is less sensitive to the short term policy changes. By study-
ing the money markets of Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and UK, Kearns, Manners, et al. (2005) found 
that an unanticipated tightening of 25 basis points policy rate in Australia is associated with exchange rate 
appreciation of 0.35 percent. Pagano, Lombardi, and Anzuini (2010) found that expansionary U.S. monetary 
policy shocks drove up the commodity price index and all of its index’s components. Hypothetical unantici-
pated 100 basis points hike in the federal funds target rate is associated with roughly an 3 percent decrease 
in West Texas Intermediate oil prices, which was been figured out by Rosa (2013). Jansen and Zervou 
(2015) found that increases in one percentage point surprise of federal fund rate decreases the one day stock 
return by 1.33 percent during the period of 1989 to 2000, and by 7.47 percent during the period 2001 to 
2007, so the effect is varied over different time periods. Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) found that a hypothet-
ical unanticipated 25 basis points cut in the federal fund rates target is associated with about one percent 
increase in broad stock indexes. In addition, the unanticipated monetary policy actions on expected excess 
returns accounted for the largest part of the response of stock prices. Fawley and Neely (2014) investigated 
the related research in recent years and gave the summary to those empirical findings. 
4. Measuring monetary policy and the empirical model 
From the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) proposed by Malkiel and Fama (1970), asset prices only re-
spond to the unanticipated part of the economic information, as the financial markets are forward looking 
and exhibit future equilibrium. Due to the fact that private entities are majority forces of financial markets, 
the group decisions of buying and selling assets in a centralized market can improve the market efficiency 
and help to discover fair values of the assets. Private sectors look at the positive and negative news of the 
economy and decide to buy or sell securities by their own judgment. Measuring the market expectation can 
be done by reading the news and comparing the pre and post event news, but quantifying the expectation is 
not an easy task, since most of the expectation is reflected from the market news. Kuttner (2001) pioneered a 
tool to quantify the size of the monetary policy shock by using the Federal Fund Rate Futures contract which 
is an interest rate derivatives traded in Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT). The settlement futures rate is trad-
ed by the average of that month’s effective fed fund rate, plus a risk premium: 
                                                     
6 Also the most important channel, Federal Reserve Bank of New York illustrated the monetary policy transmission process as the 
following steps: the Federal Reserve Bank trades the treasury and federal agent securities market by open market operations, in 
order to change and influence the fed fund rate in to the target level (policy rate). Fed fund rate is the overnight inter-bank lending 
rate from one financial institution to another similar financial institution, it’s change and controlling by federal reserve can impact 
other short term interest rate and long term interest rate further. Market interest rate thereby can direct the trader’s behavior by arbi-
trage on financial assets, such as stock market, exchange rate, corporate bonds and other assets, and the change of asset prices can 
therefore influence the consumer behaviors and real business practice. 
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For the equation above, 
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,tsFFR denotes the yield of the first federal fund futures contract
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s, which is equal to the expected average federal fund rate, ir  , from day 1 to day m in that month. We as-
sume that month s has total m days, and 
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Where tir  is the average effective fed fund rate before rate decision day d and tit
rE  is the expected aver-
age fed fund rate after rate decision in month s. Kuttner (2001) thinks that the difference in fed future rate in 
the FOMC rate decision day correctly captures the market difference in expectation before and after the rate 
decision8. Then we could quantify the unexpected rate decision by the following formula: 
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One concerning about using the difference of the event day’s closing price to measure the unexpected part 
of the rate decision is that other data releases and information shock could contaminate the event day’s fed-
eral fund futures price behaviors. However, most of the data releases and fundamental changes have been 
reflected in the future monetary policy behavior. Over the very short horizons, monetary policy is the major 
driven force of the short-term interest rate, thus we do not need to worry about other informational shocks. 
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Once we have computed the unexpected component of the rate decision, then we can compute the expected 
component of the rate decision by subtracting the unexpected component from the actual rate decision. The 
variables have the following relationships: 
ectedun
tt
ected
t FFRFFRFFR
expexp            (6) 
One day response is usually enough to detect the surprising effect, since the asset prices after event day 
could be easily contaminated by other information, but we will examine the effect in the last section by ex-
tending our regression framework into more event days9 . In this paper, we add a GARCH(1,1) process to 
detect the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices response in event days. The estimation of 
the monetary policy on asset prices can be written as the following function: 
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Besides, we assume different variance across time period that: 
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In the equation above, )log()log( 1 ttt PPR  denote the return of asset prices in the event date t compares 
to the previous date t − 1. 1P  is the asset prices at day t and 1tP  is the asset prices at day t − 1, which is the 
closing price before interest rate decision date. 0 , 1  and 2  denote the regression coefficients for equa-
tion (7), they are the reflection of the size of the monetary policy effect. We assume that the error term t  is 
distributed normally, but we relax the assumption that it is independent and identically distributed (IID). 
Thus, in this paper, a GARCH(1,1) model, which is introduced by Bollerslev (1986), based on the pioneer-
ing work of Engle (1982) on ARCH, has been employed to estimate the process of variation in variances of 
the time series regression error term t . The GARCH specification is illustrated by the equation (9), while
10  ，  and 2  are the coefficients of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) based on the GARCH(1,1) 
processes. 
2
1t is the squared last period residual estimate, and 
2
1tu  is the variances of the error term. We 
study the event day’s response of multiple asset prices to the unexpected and expected part of the monetary 
policy. 
5. The datasets 
The datasets in this paper are collected mainly through Bloomberg. We use the first month Fed Fund Futures 
to gauge the size of the monetary policy shock. The daily time series with closing settlement price spans 
from February 1989 to December 2008. Given the superiority of the futures market data on predicting policy 
behavior, we use the possible maximum length of the Fed Fund Futures data from the first listed futures 
contract in 1989 to the post-crisis unconventional monetary policy period futures data in 2008. For the asset 
price’s response part, we incorporate different kinds of asset classes in our research, based on the theory of 
transmission channels’ signaling effect. First, we study the response of the term structure of interest rate in 
U.S. The yield curve is constructed based on the implied nominal interest rate of 3, 6, and 12 months; 2, 5, 
10 and the 30 years Treasury securities. The dependent variables are the differences in basis points in the 
study of Treasury securities. For currencies, we select the group 10 (G-10) exchange rates which are the 
popular currency pairs in trading volume: U.S. Dollar (USD), EURO (EUR), Pounds Sterling (GBP), Swiss 
Franc (CHF), Japanese Yen (JPY), Canadian Dollar (CAD), Australian Dollar (AUD), New Zealand Dollar 
(NZD), Swedish Krona (SEK), Norwegian Krone (NOK). In addition, 9 Emerging market currency pairs are 
                                                     
9 In addition, direct observation of trading behaviors supports the argument that most of the unexpected announcement can drive the 
asset prices in that day, but it also disappears very fast. 
  SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2017 
 27 
added in the study: Brazilian Real (BRL), South African Rand (SAR), Polish Zloty (PLN), Romanian Leu 
(RON), Indian Rupee (INR), Czech Koruna (CZK), Chilean Peso (CLP), Hungarian Forint (HUF), and 
Mexican Peso (MXN). Equities Indexes are studied, both for developed and developing countries. We in-
clude S&P 500 index as the approximate response of U.S. equity market; Nikkei 225 for Japan; DAX for 
Germany or Euro Areas; FTSE 100 for United Kingdom; Hang Seng Index which is traded in Hong Kong 
for Chinese Companies; and IBOVESPA Index for Brazilian Listed Companies. Commodities Prices also 
have been added, they are Gold Spot Prices and the first contract of WTI Crude Oil Futures in Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange (CME). Table 1 summarizes the information of financial market data sets. Figure 1 plotted 
the historical level of the fed fund target rate. In recent years, the short term interest rate is not so volatile 
and it is neither not so serially correlated, but the Federal Reserve usually adjusts their bench market policy 
rate consecutively, followed by several times of rate hiking or rate cutting.  
6. Effects of the Federal Reserve’s interest rate decisions 
The Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) sets the federal funds target rate at a level that can improve 
the macroeconomic condition. After an interest decision announcement, the 3-month and 6-month Treasury 
rates will respond first, followed by the movements of the long-term Treasury rates10. In addition, foreign 
exchange rates, domestic and international stock market prices, and the commodities prices are other asset 
prices that the short term target rate can influence further. 
A. Effects on interest rates 
The long-term interest rate is the future period short-term interest rate, and thus is partly determined by the 
short-term rate through the yield curve arbitrages. Figure 4 displays the time series of the short-term and the 
long-term interest rates in the US. From the graph, we can observe directly that the correlations among in-
terest rates are very high. The closely related price pattern for treasury securities is consistent with the story 
that the Fed can impact the short-term interest rates and thereby change the long-term interest rates. Table 4, 
Panel A reports the results of the regression indicated by equation (7) and equation (9). We also observe that 
only the unexpected changes of the monetary policy influenced the treasury rates significantly. Although the 
3-month and 6-month rates are sensitive to the expected part of the rate decision, the sizes of sensitivity are 
very small, which are only one fourth of the sizes of the coefficients from unexpected rate decision. Specifi-
cally, an unexpected 100 basis points (bps) cut of the federal funds target rate will lower the 3-month treas-
ury rate by 44 bps, the 6-month by 37 bps, the 1-year by 33 bps, the 2 year by 31 bps, the 5 year by 23 bps, 
the 10 year by 9 bps and the 30 year by 2 bps. The impacts on yield curve favored the short-term interest 
rates more than the long-term ones. At the same time, the goodness of fit (
2R ) of the regressions decreased 
as the dependent variables changed from short-term to long-term interest rate changes. Volatility prediction 
is mixed, some variances are significantly related to the past variances, while some are significantly related 
to the past squared residuals. Our results on interest rate responses to the monetary policy surprises are con-
sistent with the previous study done by Kuttner (2001), the sample length of which spans from 1989 to 
200011.  
Next, we conduct a new study by excluding the rate decision observations from the dot-com bubble (1999-
2000) and sub-prime mortgage crisis period (2007-2008). The regression results are shown in Table 4, Panel 
B. In response to the persistent soaring of high tech company stock prices, the Fed12 held four consecutive 
interest hikes from 5.25 percent to 6.5 percent, from December 16, 1999 to the May 16, 2000. From the 
September 18, 2007 to the December 16, 2008, the Fed cut the federal fund rate from 5.25 percent to 0-0.25 
percent level. The purpose of the prompt rate cut is to support the falling housing prices, boost investments 
and consumption activities, provide liquidity to the market, and finally try to bail out the economy from the 
crisis. These periods are different from the normal policy time, since most of the decisions are temporal and 
                                                     
10 Long term rates move after short term rates since a long term rate is a traded future short term rate. 
 11 This part is similar to Kuttner (2001) and Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) in ideas and objective, but the data and the model is dif-
ferent. We have better data quality to test the hypothesis. We derived the futures contract’s expectation formation process, as well as 
the modeling in volatility by GARCH(1,1), a non linear relationship is included. And the assumption of IID error term is also re-
laxed due to the time series data’s property. This is paper is different from Jansen and Zervou (2015) in data sample selection, ideas 
and objectives. 
12 The Federal Reserve is chaired by Alan Greenspan during the dot-com bubble period, so as the related monetary policies. 
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emergent reactions to market volatility. After excluding the observations in Bubble and Crisis periods, how-
ever, the results are not much different from the results by using the full data sample. 
We also estimate the shift of the Treasury yield curve during the interest rate decision events. Figure 5 dis-
plays a shift of the yield curve when the market encountered a monetary policy surprise during 2007-08 
financial crisis periods. The Fed cut the target interest rate by 75 bps from 4.25 percent to 3.5 percent. How-
ever, the federal funds futures rate only implied a modest 9 bps decrease, which led to a 66 bps decrease of 
unexpected component. The results are consistent with previous findings in this paper(Table 4, Panel A, B) 
that the short term interest rates of the yield curve lowered more than the long term interest rates. We also 
observe that after an unexpected cut of federal funds target rate, the yield curve shifted downward and be-
came steeper. The uncertainty of the future monetary policy can explain the more sensitivity of short-term 
rates than long-term rates to the Fed’s interest rate decisions. 
B. Effects on foreign exchange rates 
In theory, an increase in the US interest rate will cause capital inflow to the US, induce investor to buy more 
dollars, and appreciate the US dollar against other currencies. In this part, we estimate the effects of the 
Fed’s interest rate decisions on the exchange rates of foreign currencies in G-10 and emerging economies, 
and we treat US dollar as the basis currency. We run the regressions by replacing the dependent variables as 
the foreign exchange rate returns and report the results in Table 5. In general, an unexpected hike of the 
federal funds target rate appreciated US dollar against other currencies. In the case of using full data sample, 
an unexpected 100 bps increase in the federal funds target rate depreciated G-10 currencies enormously on 
the same day, except for Euro (EUR) and Great Britain Pound (GBP). Similarly, emerging currencies, espe-
cially Russian Rubble (RUB), South Africa Rand (ZAR) and Czech Republic Koruna (CZK) depreciated a 
lot on the same day of the event. When excluding the dot-com bubbles and financial crisis periods and rerun 
the regressions, we observe that although foreign currencies depreciated on the event day, the sizes of de-
preciation diminished. This difference tells use that foreign exchange rates were more sensitive to the US 
monetary policy shocks in the crisis periods than in the ordinary periods. In addition, the results are much 
different from the results of the treasury market, in which the responses of treasury rates to monetary policy 
shocks are indifferent whether crisis periods are excluded or not. 
C. Effects on equity prices 
Although previous findings claim that monetary policy drives U.S. equities market, Bernanke and Kuttner 
(2005), Jansen and Zervou (2015), we find insignificant responses of equity prices in the US and interna-
tional equity markets to the unexpected changes of the Fed’s interest rate decisions. The results do not vary 
so much even when we exclude the bubble and crisis periods. 
D. Effects on commodities prices 
Although Bernanke (2013)13 held a negative view of predicting gold prices, we find that the Fed’s monetary 
policy shocks did have significant impacts on gold prices. From Table 7, an unexpected 100 bps increase in 
the federal funds target rate led to a 46 bps decline of the gold spot price return with full data sample and a 
57 bps decline when bubble and crisis periods are excluded. As gold prices are considered as the indicator of 
future period inflation, our results further indicate that the Fed’s interest rate shocks have influence on the 
expected inflation as well. We find the unexpected increase in the federal funds target rate boosted the oil 
futures price, however, the effects were not statistically significant. 
7. Pre-meeting and post-meeting effects 
In order to know financial markets’ behaviors around the Fed’s interest rate decisions, we then evaluate the 
responses of asset prices in an 11-day event window14. We regress the asset return on each day in the event 
window on expected and unexpected parts of the monetary policy change on the event day. The regression is 
expressed as: 
it
ectedexpun
ti
ectedexp
tiiit FFRFFRR    210                  (10) 
                                                     
13 For more details of Bernanke’s speech, please click the link below: http://business.financialpost.com/news/economy/ben-
bernanke-nobody-understands-gold-prices-including-me. 
14 A symmetric window with five pre-event days and five post-event days. 
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For the formula showed above,  ]5,5[i  and itR   denotes the asset returns on day t + i in an event win-
dow. Through the empirical estimation on this regression function’s coefficients, we can observe the move-
ments of asset prices before and after an interest rate decision. Table 8, 9, and 10 show the effects of ex-
pected and unexpected monetary policy changes on prices of assets in different markets. From Table 8, we 
see that unexpected policy effects are larger in magnitude than expected policy effects in general. Although 
the asset returns of 1 day before and 1 day after the FOMC rate decision days are significantly impacted by 
the rate decision of the Fed, the coefficients are much smaller. The non-event day coefficients are only 1/3 
or 1/4 of the size of the event days. When comparing the effects on Treasury rates of different maturities, we 
find that the monetary policy shocks have significant pre-meeting and post-meeting effects only on the 
short-term rates, but not on the long term rates. For instance, the 3-month and 6-month Treasury rates both 
increased by about 11 bps one day before the event day, the 1-year and 2-year Treasury rates only increased 
by about 8 bps, while the increases of longer term Treasury rates are tiny and insignificant. Figure 6 shows 
the coefficients of [-5, 5] event window estimation of the monetary policy’s effect. We can conclude that 
only the unexpected monetary policy shock could impact the bond yield. In most of the cases, they have 
impacts on event day 0, but continue to event day +1 and +3.  
From Table 9, we find serious post-announcement effects on exchange rates, but the effects diminished after 
the 4th and the 5th days. Post-announcement effects can be interpreted as the under reaction of markets, 
while the efficient markets hypothesis does not hold. For example, an unexpected 100 basis points cut of the 
Federal Funds rate target appreciated Swedish Krona vs U.S. dollars (SEK/USD) exchange rate by 0.61% on 
day 0 and 0.45% on day 1, while the exchange rate only depreciated by 0.34% on day 4 and 0.35% on day 5. 
For another example, after an unexpected increase of 100 bps of the Federal funds rate target, the Great 
Britain Pound (GBP) appreciated by 0.38% on day 0 and 0.50% on day 1. However, started from the day 2, 
the GBP depreciated and the depreciation were getting larger in the following days. Similar results can be 
seen from most of the exchange rates. 
Different from the previous results, in Table 10, we do not find any evidence of significant one day effects 
of monetary policy shock on equity prices. However, it is obvious that the equities indices in other countries 
are negatively related to the unexpected interest rate hikes of the federal funds rate target. For instance, a 
100 bps unexpected increase in the federal funds rate target decreased Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index by 
2.84% on the 2nd event day, and then the index return continued to decline on the 3rd and the 5th days. 
Conclusions 
This paper uses event studies in a macroeconomic framework to study the responses of a broad class of as-
sets to monetary policy surprises in the US. The assets include U.S. government bonds and equities, U.S. 
dollar against the major G-10 and major emerging market currencies, international stock markets, and commodi-
ty prices. We use the Federal Fund Futures rate to gauge the market expectation of the interest rate decision of the 
FOMC and separate the market expectation on target rate decision into unexpected and expected components. By 
using GARCH(1,1) specification in a one day event horizon, we find that treasury bills and exchange rates of 
developed countries were significantly influenced by the unexpected component of the Fed’s monetary policy 
from 1989 to 2008, while emerging market exchange rates responded weakly to the Fed’s monetary policy sur-
prises. In addition, we find that international equity and commodity markets were not sensitive to the Fed’s mon-
etary policy in an one day horizon. Given one day window case, the results are different when we extend the 
event window into 11 days (i.e., [-5, 5]). The unexpected component of the monetary policy impacted the finan-
cial markets in a long horizon, which is contrary to the efficient market hypothesis. Almost all of the financial 
assets in our study significantly responded to the monetary policy shock during five days after the meeting. How-
ever, the results are slightly different among bond yields, foreign exchange rates and international equities. When 
encountering an unexpected increase in federal funds rate, the Treasury bills had late responses but not midterm 
notes and long term bonds. In other words, they responded a little before the decision makings of the interest rate, 
which infers that the bond markets are more informative than other financial markets. The exchange rates had a 
mean reversion behavior on post-meeting days, which means after rate decision date, they usually recovered back 
in the next few days. Non-US equity markets were not affected by the Fed’s monetary policy shock so much. 
However, a surprise in Fed’s monetary policy had effects on the U.S. stock market for several days which could 
consecutively influence non-US stock markets, especially the emerging markets. Further studies could be con-
ducted to show that how long the monetary policy influenced each asset price and how many days the ef-
fects were persisting. 
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Appendices 
Table 1. Summary of data sets and key variables 
This table reports the source of the data sets and the time span of the financial market data. They are daily frequency. Most the data 
sets are drawn from the Bloomberg Terminal. We use spot exchange rate, interest rate, commodities and equities index to identify 
the response of the financial markets, which are supposed to play the same role when other people use the futures contract of those 
financial assets. After Dec 2008, the Federal Reserve had kept the fed fund target rate into 0-0.25 percent level, and although the 
futures prices are available, there is no rate decision since 2015. While before 1989 Feb, the Futures contract of the fed fund rate has 
not been introduced, thus the data is not available for researchers. 
Financial Market Variables Source of Data Sample Periods Frequency 
Front Month Fed Fund Futures Contract #1 Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Front Month Fed Fund Futures Contract #2 Quandl Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 3 Month Treasury Bill Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 6 Month Treasury Bill Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 12 Month Treasury Bill Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 2 Year Treasury Notes Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 5 Year Treasury Notes Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 10 Year Treasury Notes Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. 30 Year Treasury Bonds Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.S. S&P 500 Index Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Japan, Nikkei 225 Index Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Hong Kong (PRC), Hang Seng Index Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
U.K., FTSE 100 Index Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Germany, DAX Index Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Gold Spot Prices, U.S. dollar denominated Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
CME, WTI Crude Oil Futures, Contract #1 Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
EURO, EUR Spot Exchange Rate Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Pounds Sterling, GBP Spot Exchange Rate Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Swiss Franc, CHF Spot  Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Japanese Yen, JPY Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Canadian Dollar, CAD Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Australian Dollar, AUD Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
New Zealand Dollar, NZD Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Sweden Krone, SEK Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Norwegian Krone, NOK Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Brazilian Real, BRL Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
South African Rand, ZAR Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Polish Zloty, PLN Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Romanian Leu, RON Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Indian Rupee, INR Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Czech Koruna, CZK Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Chilean Peso, CLP Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Hungarian Forint, HUF Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
Mexican Peso, MXN Spot Bloomberg Feb 1989-Dec 2008 Daily 
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Table 2. Historic Rate Decision for U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Feb 1989 to Dec 2008 
Table 2 lists the historic rate decision. The Mystique periods (orange colored) are the times before February 1994, the FOMC did 
not announce their rate decision, but implemented the monetary policy through Open Market Operation through the trading desk of 
the New York Fed. The Grey color area covers the period of bubble and financial crisis periods. The orange area covers the periods 
of no announcement monetary policy periods. 
Date Changes 
New 
level 
 
Time Methods of announcement Intermeeting? Unexpected Expected 
12/16/2008 -1 0-0.25  2:15 PM Post-meeting press release  -0.11 -0.89 
10/29/2008 -0.5 1  2:15 PM Post-meeting press release  -0.28 -0.22 
10/8/2008 -0.5 1.5 
 
7:00 AM 
Immediate release (press 
release)  
-0.14 -0.36 
4/30/2008 -0.25 2  2:15 PM Post-meeting press release  0.3 -0.55 
3/18/2008 -0.75 2.25  2:15 PM Post-meeting press release  0.16 -0.91 
1/30/2008 -0.5 3  2:00 PM Intermeeting press release Y 0 -0.5 
1/22/2008 -0.75 3.5  2:00 PM Post-meeting press release  -0.67 -0.08 
12/11/2007 -0.25 4.25  2:00 PM Intermeeting press release Y 0.01 -0.26 
10/31/2007 -0.25 4.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 -0.25 
9/18/2007 -0.5 4.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.14 -0.36 
6/29/2006 0.25 5.25  2:15 PM Post-meeting press release  -0.08 0.33 
5/10/2006 0.25 5 
 
2:00 PM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.01 0.26 
3/28/2006 0.25 4.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
1/31/2006 0.25 4.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
12/13/2005 0.25 4.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
11/1/2005 0.25 4  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
9/20/2005 0.25 3.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.01 0.24 
8/9/2005 0.25 3.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
6/30/2005 0.25 3.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
5/3/2005 0.25 3  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
3/22/2005 0.25 2.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
2/2/2005 0.25 2.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
12/14/2004 0.25 2.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
11/10/2004 0.25 2  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.25 
9/21/2004 0.25 1.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.02 0.23 
8/10/2004 0.25 1.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.02 0.23 
6/30/2004 0.25 1.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.15 0.1 
6/25/2003 -0.25 1  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 -0.25 
11/6/2002 -0.5 1.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.19 -0.31 
12/11/2001 -0.25 1.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 -0.25 
11/6/2001 -0.5 2  2:20 PM Post meeting press release  -0.1 -0.4 
10/2/2001 -0.5 2.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.07 -0.43 
9/17/2001 -0.5 3  8:20 AM Intermeeting press release Y -0.3 -0.2 
8/21/2001 -0.25 3.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.01 -0.26 
6/27/2001 -0.25 3.75  2:12 PM Post meeting press release  0.04 -0.29 
5/15/2001 -0.5 4  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.07 -0.43 
4/18/2001 -0.5 4.5  10:54 AM Intermeeting press release Y -0.39 -0.11 
3/20/2001 -0.5 5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.05 -0.55 
1/31/2001 -0.5 5.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 -0.5 
1/3/2001 -0.5 6  1:13 PM Intermeeting press release Y -0.01 -0.49 
5/16/2000 0.5 6.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.05 0.45 
3/21/2000 0.25 6  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.03 0.28 
2/2/2000 0.25 5.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.05 0.3 
11/16/1999 0.25 5.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.08 0.17 
8/24/1999 0.25 5.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.02 0.23 
6/30/1999 0.25 5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.3 0.55 
11/17/1998 -0.25 4.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.05 -0.2 
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Table 2 (cont.). Historic Rate Decision for U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Feb. 1989 to Dec. 2008 
10/15/1998 -0.25 5  3:15 PM Intermeeting press release Y 0.04 -0.29 
9/29/1998 -0.25 5.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0 -0.25 
3/25/1997 0.25 5.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.04 0.21 
1/31/1996 -0.25 5.25  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.16 -0.1 
12/19/1995 -0.25 5.5  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.1 -0.15 
7/6/1995 -0.25 5.75  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  -0.01 -0.24 
2/1/1995 0.5 6  2:15 PM Post meeting press release  0.05 0.45 
11/15/1994 0.75 5.5  2:20 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.75 
8/16/1994 0.5 4.75  1:18 PM Post meeting press release  0 0.5 
5/17/1994 0.5 4.25  2:26 PM Post meeting press release  0.13 0.37 
4/18/1994 0.25 3.75  10:06 AM Post meeting press release  0.09 0.16 
3/22/1994 0.25 3.5  2:20 PM Post meeting press release  -0.03 0.28 
2/4/1994 0.25 3.25  11:05 PM Post meeting press release  0.11 0.14 
9/4/1992 -0.25 3  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.21 -0.04 
7/2/1992 -0.5 3.25 
 
9:15 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.35 -0.15 
4/9/1992 -0.25 3.75  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.23 -0.02 
12/20/1991 -0.5 4 
 
8:30 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.26 -0.24 
12/6/1991 -0.25 4.5  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.08 -0.17 
11/6/1991 -0.25 4.75 
 
8:45 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.12 -0.13 
10/31/1991 -0.25 5     -0.62 0.37 
9/13/1991 -0.25 5.25 
 
9:10 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.05 -0.2 
8/6/1991 -0.25 5.5  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.14 -0.11 
4/30/1991 -0.25 5.75 
 
9:30 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.3 0.05 
3/8/1991 -0.25 6  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.16 -0.1 
2/1/1991 -0.5 6.25 
 
9:15 AM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y -0.53 0.03 
1/9/1991 -0.25 6.75     -0.12 -0.13 
12/18/1990 -0.25 7 
 
3:30 PM 
Discount rate change press 
release 
Y 0.02 -0.27 
12/7/1990 -0.25 7.25  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.26 0.01 
11/13/1990 -0.25 7.5     -0.03 -0.22 
10/29/1990 -0.25 7.75  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.21 -0.04 
7/13/1990 -0.25 8  11:30 AM Open market operation Y -0.13 -0.12 
2/24/1989 0.25 9.75     0.04 0.21 
Total observation: 79 
 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas and New York City. 
Table 3. Unusual periods for monetary policy in United States, 1989 to 2008 
We intend to omit the data point/observations during the financial crisis periods, for robustness checks. In the table below, we only 
list the crisis events that have been covered by the time from 1989 to 2008 which is the time length of our data sample. 
Years Financial Crisis Event and the Federal Reserve’s Reaction on Monetary Policy 
2007 to 2008 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis. The crash of the U.S. housing market triggered the crisis, followed by the 
bankruptcy of large financial institutions and stock market turmoil. Fed’s reaction on policy: Interest 
Rate Cut from 5.25% to 0-0.25% level, from the 18th Sept, 2007 to the 16th Dec, 2008’s zero lower 
bound. The chairman was Ben S. Bernanke.  
1999 to 2000 
Dot-com Bubble. Internet related stock prices raised to a level that is apparently higher than their fun-
damental values. Fed’s reaction on policy: Four consecutive Interest Rate hikes from 5.25% to 6.5%, 
from the 16th December, 1999 to the 16th May, 2010. The chairman was Alan Greenspan. 
Prior to September 
1994 
No announcements after the FOMC meeting, but Open Market Operation on Fed Fund Rate. It is called 
the mystique period of monetary policy. 
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This figure shows the historic level of the fed fund target rate. We can see that the interest rate lowers as the 
time approaches the recent periods. After the subprime mortgage financial crisis, Federal Reserve has kept 
the target Fed Fund Rate at 0.00-0.25% level until December 2015.  
 
Figure 1. The evolution of the Fed Fund target rate 
Figure 2 displays the changes of rate decision from February 1989 to December 2008.  
 
Figure 2. The distribution of rate decision across different time period 
The figure below shows the unexpected component of the monetary policy which is implied from the Fed 
Fund Futures, we use the equation:   
∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 =
𝑚
𝑚 − 𝑡
(𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑠,𝑡
1 − 𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑠,𝑡−1
1 ) 
In order to compute the unexpected interest rate changes: ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
. Where m is the number of days 
in month s, t represents the event day. Below is the figure that listed the ∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑
 over time. We can 
directly observe that before 1994, there are much more unexpected rate decisions, the sizes are big enough 
to drive the market prices. During the financial crisis period from 2007 to 2008, the market (fed fund fu-
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tures) also had wrong predictions of the actual rate decision behaviors and the monetary policy shock still 
existed in that period, although the Federal Reserve started to increase the transparency between monetary 
authority and market participants. 
 
Figure 3. The size of the unexpected monetary policy which is measured by Fed Fund Futures 
This figure displays the time series of short-term and long-term interest rates in the US. We can observe that the 
short-term and long-term interest rates followed the same trends at most of the time. FF1 stands for the federal 
funds futures rate, 3m indicates the 3-month treasury rate, and 30y stands for the 30-year treasury rate.  
Figure 4. Historical interest rate in the U.S. 
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Table 4. Responses of treasury rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
The results of this table are based on the GARCH (1,1) process regression:  
 𝑅𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾2∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡  
𝜀𝑡|𝜀𝑡−1, 𝜀𝑡−2, 𝜀𝑡−3, … ~ 𝑁(0, 𝑢𝑡
2) 
              𝑢𝑡
2 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛽2𝑢𝑡−1
2   
𝑅𝑡 denotes the asset returns on the event day t. 𝛾0, 𝛾1and 𝛾2 are the linear regression coefficients. 𝛽0, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 are the 
coefficients of the GARCH(1,1) process. 𝜀𝑡  is the residual of the mean equation, while 𝑢𝑡 is the variances of 𝜀𝑡. The 
values in parentheses denote the robust standard errors. 
Panel A (Full sample) 
Parameters 3 month 6 month 12 month 2 year 5 year 10 year 30 year 
𝛾0 -0.013 -0.021** -0.009 0.001 -0.005 0.002 -0.029** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011) 
𝛾1 0.167*** 0.104*** 0.005 0.041 -0.009 -0.041* -0.067* 
 (0.032) (0.025) (0.040) (0.032) (0.030) (0.025) (0.038) 
𝛾2 0.442*** 0.371*** 0.335*** 0.314*** 0.229*** 0.092** 0.016 
 (0.046) (0.033) (0.080) (0.057) (0.063) (0.042) (0.059) 
𝛽0 0.004 0.005** 0.001* 0.001 0.002 0.002** 0.002 
 (0.007) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.005) 
𝛽1 -0.042 0.448** 0.539** 0.173 0.120 0.647* 0.071 
 (0.067) (0.164) (0.24) (0.120) (0.141) (0.343) (0.200) 
𝛽2 0.570 -0.070 0.405* 0.641*** 0.678** 0.182 0.587 
 (0.821) (0.289) (0.233) (0.174) (0.229) (0.179) (0.972) 
𝑅2 0.51 0.48 0.39 0.27 0.14 0.04 0.06 
Durbin- Watson 1.83 2.22 2.00 2.30 2.17 2.14 2.14 
Obs. 79 79 46 79 79 79 63 
Panel B (Subsample) 
Parameters 3 month 6 month 12 month 2 year 5 year 10 year 30 year 
𝛾0 -0.011 -0.019** -0.004 -0.002 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001*** 
 (0.015) (0.008) (0.016) (0.001) (0.013) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛾1 0.166*** 0.096*** 0.104 0.061 0.019 -0.018 -0.067*** 
 (0.027) (0.025) (0.058) (0.041) (0.042) (0.092) (0.000) 
𝛾2 0.418*** 0.316*** 0.380*** 0.309*** 0.282*** 0.161** 0.008*** 
 (0.064) (0.036) (0.106) (0.065) (0.070) (0.042) (0.000) 
𝛽0 0.004 0.003*** 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) 
𝛽1 -0.045 0.769*** 0.465 0.172 -0.154 -0.132 6.336*** 
 (0.071) (0.164) (0.296) (0.154) (0.103) (0.092) (0.634) 
𝛽2 0.574 -0.033 0.437 0.618* 1.15*** 1.161*** 0.000 
 (0.733) (0.041) (0.310) (0.286) (0.146) (0.130) (0.143) 
𝑅2 0.46 0.43 0.42 0.29 0.14 0.05 -0.12 
Durbin- Watson 1.95 1.96 2.01 2.15 2.13 2.19 1.74 
Obs. 65 65 42 65 65 65 65 
Notes: the code***denote the significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
This figure shows the shift of the Treasury yield curve after one of the rate decision events during the 2008 financial 
crisis period. The Federal Reserve Board cut the target interest rate from 4.25% to 3.5%, which are 75 basis points. 
However, the federal fund futures rate only implied a modest 0 to 25 basis points cut, which led to an unexpected de-
crease of 66 basis points. The dashed line is the yield curve on January 18, 2008, which is the prior trading day before 
FOMC rate decision. The solid line is the yield curve on January 22, 2008, which is the event day. We can see that 
after the unexpected cutting of federal funds target rate, the yield curve shifted downward and became steeper.  
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Figure 5. The unexpected interest rate cut and the movement of the yield curve 
Table 5. Responses of foreign exchange rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
This table reports the results of G-10 and Emerging Market exchange rates. All the exchange rates are denoted as  
𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦
𝑈𝑆 𝑑𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑟
. The estimation is based on GARCH(1,1) process regression, which is express as equation (8) and (9). 
The robust standard errors are reported in the parentheses.  
Panel A: G-10 exchange rates (full sample) 
Parameters EUR GBP JPY CAD CHF NOK SEK AUD NZD 
𝛾0 0.049 -0.003 0.015 -0.016*** -0.027 -0.004 0.004 0.092** 0.034 
 (0.024) (0.032) (0.030) (0.000) (0.041) (0.012) (0.030) (0.034) (0.057) 
𝛾1 0.017 -0.184** 0.014 0.051 0.189 0.104*** 0.294*** 0.007 -0.054 
 (0.070) (0.094) (0.096) (0.083) (0.132) (0.000) (0.087) (0.160) (0.158) 
𝛾2 -0.211* -0.376** 0.654*** 0.063 0.528** 0.608*** 0.630*** 0.135 0.050 
 (0.126) (0.175) (0.169) (0.068) (0.241) (0.197) (0.236) (0.282) (0.361) 
𝛽0 0.032* 0.016* 0.016 0.001*** 0.027** 0.005 0.021* 0.012*** 0.021** 
 (0.016) (0.011) (0.011) (0.000) (0.016) (0.005) (0.012) (0.002) (0.006) 
𝛽1 0.565* 0.083 0.516* -0.188*** -0.025 -0.191*** -0.090** -0.163*** -0.035 
 (0.274) (0.119) (0.323) (0.037) (0.056) (0.054) (0.034) (0.023) (0.032) 
𝛽2 0.041 0.609** 0.423* 1.063*** 0.728*** 1.113*** 0.807*** 1.030*** 0.83*** 
 (0.282) (0.234) (0.214) (0.053) (0.241) (0.06) (0.139) (0.040) (0.052) 
𝑅2 0.01 0.13 0.07 -0.03 0.13 0.09 0.123 -0.004 0.003 
Durbin-Watson 1.41 2.00 2.30 1.66 1.84 1.88 1.98 2.12 1.83 
Obs 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 
Panel B: G-10 exchange rates (subsample) 
Parameters EUR GBP JPY CAD CHF NOK SEK AUD NZD 
𝛾0 0.062** 0.012 0.004 -0.026 -0.072*** -0.027 -0.049** 0.037 0.012 
 (0.025) (0.037) (0.028) (0.025) (0.002) (0.039) (0.020) (0.056) (0.068) 
𝛾1 0.018 -0.134*** 0.066* 0.012 0.146 -0.006 0.115 0.051 -0.023 
 (0.076) (0.004) (0.095) (0.066) (0.168) (0.180) (0.141) (0.201) (0.179) 
𝛾2 -0.053 -0.280 0.656*** 0.067 0.333 0.387*** 0.379 0.051 0.153 
 (0.137) (0.235) (0.173) (0.150) (0.315) (0.007) (0.259) (0.376) (0.432) 
𝛽0 0.038* 0.000 0.032* 0.009 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.005 0.046 
 (0.019) (0.005) (0.021) (0.011) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.298) 
𝛽1 0.531* -0.133 0.801* 0.069 -0.125 -0.144** -0.126** -0.177** -0.015 
 (0.243) (0.128) (0.426) (0.131) (0.071) (0.053) (0.051) (0.087) (0.146) 
𝛽2 -0.066 1.140*** 0.013 0.527 1.118*** 1.124*** 1.113*** 1.000*** 0.56 
 (0.270) (0.204) (0.205) (0.532) (0.157) (0.096) (0.113) (0.082) (2.917) 
𝑅2 -0.01 0.07 0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.006 0.004 
Durbin-Watson 2.08 2.06 2.10 1.74 2.41 2.14 2.27 2.00 2.08 
Obs 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 65 
0
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1
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2
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3
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4
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3 month 6 month 2 year 5 year 10 year 30 year
1/22/2008 1/18/2008
SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2017   
 38 
Table 5 (cont.). Responses of foreign exchange rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
Panel C: G-10 exchange rates (full sample) 
Parameters EUR GBP JPY CAD CHF NOK SEK AUD NZD 
𝛾0 -0.037 0.020 -0.066 -0.027*** -0.033 -0.05** -0.028 0.003 -0.018*** 
 (0.026) (0.027) (0.047) (0.006) (0.047) (0.018) (0.063) (0.010) (0.000) 
𝛾1 0.244*** 0.008 0.099 -0.054 0.234 0.329*** 0.105 -0.012 0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.095) (0.134) (0.086) (0.145) (0.036) (0.167) (0.032) (0.002) 
𝛾2 0.561** 0.450*** 0.334 0.042 -0.031 0.840*** -0.430* -0.088** 0.005* 
 (0.186) (0.108) (0.250) (0.217) (0.380) (0.133) (0.240) (0.044) (0.003) 
𝛽0 -0.003** 0.001 0.023*** 0.002** 0.009 0.009*** 0.012** 0.001*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.007) (0.002) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) 
𝛽1 -0.060*** 0.138** -0.112*** -0.231*** 0.071 -0.160*** 0.067 -0.075*** -0.049** 
 (0.007) (0.065) (0.016) (0.057) (0.082) (0.043) (0.068) (0.015) (0.022) 
Panel C: G-10 exchange rates (full sample) 
Parameters EUR GBP JPY CAD CHF NOK SEK AUD NZD 
𝛽2 1.157*** 0.781*** 0.826*** 1.115*** 0.766*** 0.982*** 0.723*** 0.912*** 1.178*** 
 (0.037) (0.044) (0.043) (0.100) (0.128) (0.091) (0.100) (0.032) (0.038) 
𝑅2 -0.003 0.04 0.08 -0.10 0.07 0.24 -0.04 -0.01 -0.18 
Durbin-
Watson 
2.08 2.47 2.33 0.81 1.75 1.62 1.89 1.85 1.34 
Obs 79 79 79 49 79 79 79 79 79 
Panel D: G-10 exchange rates (subsample) 
Parameters EUR GBP JPY CAD CHF NOK SEK AUD NZD 
𝛾0 0.048 0.024 -0.059* -0.016 -0.053 -0.067 -0.040 -0.006 -0.014*** 
 (0.094) (0.031) (0.026) (0.030) (0.049) (0.045) (0.063) (0.021) (0.000) 
𝛾1 -0.304 0.006 0.174* -0.084 0.129 0.238** 0.132 -0.051 -0.009*** 
 (0.190) (0.104) (0.086) (0.085) (0.174) (0.103) (0.180) (0.074) (0.001) 
𝛾2 0.746 0.460*** -0.072 0.094 -0.575 0.326* -0.654** -0.169 0.003 
 (1.627) (0.114) (0.204) (0.101) (0.506) (0.208) (0.278) (0.128) (0.451) 
𝛽0 0.003 0.001 0.032* 0.001 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.005 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.018) (0.002) (0.010) (0.003) (0.035) (0.006) (0.000) 
𝛽1 -0.040*** 0.199* -0.538* 0.817 0.092 -0.119*** 0.111 -0.071** 0.303 
 (0.004) (0.096) (0.336) (0.572) (0.124) (0.039) (0.218) (0.026) (0.251) 
𝛽2 1.138*** 0.765*** -0.116 0.427 0.768*** 1.056*** 0.741 0.565 1.131*** 
 (0.030) (0.068) (0.418) (0.261) (0.250) (0.038) (0.786) (0.604) (0.042) 
𝑅2 -0.09 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.10 0.16 0.11 0.07 -0.12 
Durbin-
Watson 
1.99 2.09 2.76 1.95 1.22 1.83 1.74 1.99 1.50 
Obs 65 65 65 35 65 65 65 65 65 
Note: the code***denote the significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
Table 6. Responses of equity prices to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
Panel A (full sample) 
Parameters S&P 500 (U.S.) 
FTSE 100  
(U.K.) 
DAX 
(Germany) 
Hang Seng 
(Hong Kong, PRC) 
Nikkei 225 
(Japan) 
Ibovespa 
(Brazil) 
𝛾0 0.099 0.042 0.148 0.093 0.011* 0.496* 
 (0.098) (0.075) (0.076) (0.165) (0.069) (0.320) 
𝛾1 -0.0262 -0.107 -0.061 0.154 0.211 -0.568 
 (0.0262) (0.197) (0.185) (0.880) (0.213) (0.610) 
𝛾2 0.282 -0.238 -0.094 0.769 0.624* -1.421 
 (0.457) (0.396) (0.423) (0.974) (0.355) (3.294) 
𝛽0 0.067 0.056** 0.044** -0.081 0.098 1.557 
 (0.065) (0.027) (0.021) (0.071) (0.063) (7.570) 
𝛽1 0.110 0.035 0.032 -0.038*** 1.154** -0.035 
 (0.128) (0.073) (0.074) (0.007) (0.441) (0.180) 
  SocioEconomic Challenges, Volume 1, Issue 3, 2017 
 39 
Table 6 (cont.). Responses of equity prices to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
Panel A (full sample) 
Parameters S&P 500 (U.S.) 
FTSE 100 
(U.K.) 
DAX 
(Germany) 
Hang Seng 
(Hong Kong, PRC) 
Nikkei 225 
(Japan) 
Ibovespa 
(Brazil) 
𝛽2 0.717*** 0.692*** 0.765*** 1.056*** 0.210** 0.560 
 (0.244) (0.147) (0.087) (0.026) 0.083 (2.168) 
𝑅2 0.02 0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.00 0.04 
Durbin-Watson 1.99 2.36 1.90 2.07 2.17 2.22 
Obs 79 79 79 79 79 60 
Panel B (subsample) 
Parameters 
S&P 500 
(U.S.) 
FTSE 100 
(U.K.) 
DAX 
(Germany) 
Hang Seng 
(Hong Kong, 
PRC) 
Nikkei 225 
(Japan) 
Ibovespa 
(Brazil) 
𝛾0 -0.011 0.053 0.134* 0.041 0.080 0.393 
 (0.075) (0.077) (0.084) (0.061) (0.081) (0.523) 
𝛾1 0.091 -0.066 -0.024 0.314*** 0.184 -0.298 
 (0.267) (0.202) (0.267) (0.014) (0.228) (1.341) 
𝛾2 -0.065 -0.030 -0.130 0.467** 0.172 -2.76 
 (0.563) (0.534) (0.467) (0.156) (0.359) (6.190) 
𝛽0 0.031 0.330* 0.019 -0.002 0.245** 1.856 
 (0.037) (0.189) (0.021) (0.007) (0.010) (6.428) 
𝛽1 0.311 0.180 0.138 -0.040*** 0.636** -0.044 
 (0.234) (0.289) (0.147) (0.004) (0.283) (0.149) 
𝛽2 0.671*** -0.520 0.784*** 1.142*** -0.038 0.567 
 (0.197) (0.684) (0.157) (0.043) (0.038) (1.567) 
𝑅2 -0.02 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.03 
Durbin-Watson 2.10 1.60 1.86 2.06 1.68 2.18 
Obs 65 65 65 65 65 46 
Note: the code***denote the significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
Table 7. Reponses of commodity prices to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
Panel A (full sample) 
Parameters Gold Spot WTI Oil Futures 
𝛾0 0.015 0.045 
 (0.046) (0.121) 
𝛾1 -0.142 -0.020 
 (0.136) (0.365) 
𝛾2 -0.467* 0.266 
 (0.053) (0.907) 
𝛽0 0.005** 0.319 
 (0.002) (0.256) 
𝛽1 -0.112*** -0.109 
 (0.036) (0.076) 
𝛽2 1.077*** 0.788*** 
 (0.053) (0.221) 
𝑅2 0.08 -0.00 
Durbin-Watson 2.00 1.88 
Observations 79 79 
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Table 7. Reponses of commodity prices to the Fed’s monetary policy change 
Panel B (subsample) 
Parameters Gold Spot WTI Oil Futures 
𝛾0 -0.049 0.004 
 (0.056) (0.091) 
𝛾1 -0.212 0.422 
 (0.175) (0.334) 
𝛾2 -0.570* 0.118 
 (0.278) (0.818) 
𝛽0 0.043 0.060 
 (0.032) (0.062) 
𝛽1 -0.058 -0.157* 
 (0.061) (0.087) 
𝛽2 0.90** 1.092*** 
 (0.265) (0.059) 
𝑅2 0.04 0.02 
Durbin-Watson 1.82 1.84 
Observations 65 65 
Note: the code***denote the significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
Table 8. Responses of treasury rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change in an 11-day event window 
Treasuries 
Expected policy effect Unexpected policy effect 
Event days Event days 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
3 months 
-0.02 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(1.09) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.18*** 
(0.03) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.11*** 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.06* 
(0.03) 
0.10* 
(0.05) 
0.11*** 
(0.04) 
0.44*** 
(0.05) 
0.10* 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.10*** 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
6 months 
0 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.05* 
(0.02) 
0.03** 
(0.02) 
0.10*** 
(0.03) 
0.05** 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.08* 
(0.04) 
0.11*** 
(0.03) 
0.37*** 
(0.03) 
0.09** 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.04) 
0.08*** 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.03) 
12 months 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.05) 
0 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.34*** 
(0.08) 
0.04 
(0.06) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
2 year 
0 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.08 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.06) 
0.07** 
(0.04) 
0.31*** 
(0.06) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.00 
(0.05) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
5 year 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.05*** 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.03) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.03) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.04** 
(0.02) 
0.04 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.06) 
0.04 
(0.03) 
0.23*** 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
10 year 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0 
(0.03) 
0.03** 
(0.02) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
0.06*** 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.03 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.05 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.05) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.09* 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
30 year 
0 
(0.02) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04* 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.03* 
(0.02) 
-0.07* 
(0.04) 
0.07*** 
(0.02) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
-0.02 
(0.02) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.07 
(0.05) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.04) 
0.01 
(0.03) 
0.02 
(0.06) 
-0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.04) 
0.02 
(0.03) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
Note: the code***denote the significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
Table 8 reports the results of extended horizon regression: 𝑅𝑡+𝑖 = 𝛾0𝑖 + 𝛾1𝑖∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝛾2𝑖∆𝐹𝐹𝑅𝑡
𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ [−5, 5] which are event days in the regres-
sion. The bracket reports the robust standard error. We estimate the coefficients of effects from expected and unexpected components of the monetary policy shock by 
using OLS. 
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Figure 6. Responses of treasury rates to the fed’s monetary policy change in an 11-day event window   
Table 9. Responses of exchange rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change in an 11-day event window 
Currencies 
Expected policy effect Unexpected policy effect 
Event days Event days 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
EUR 
0.24*** 
(0.08) 
-0.09 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.03 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.12) 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.10) 
0.06 
(0.10） 
0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.15) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.19) 
0.12 
(0.17） 
0.12 
(0.17) 
-2.11* 
(0.13) 
-0.35* 
(0.22) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
0.28* 
(0.19) 
-0.24 
(0.18) 
0.37* 
(0.18) 
GBP 
0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.20** 
(0.08) 
-0.12 
(0.09) 
0.11 
(0.09) 
-0.05 
(0.13) 
-0.18** 
(0.09) 
0.05 
(0.09) 
0.27** 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.09) 
0.03 
(0.17) 
0.17 
(0.16) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.16) 
-0.29 
(0.23) 
-0.38** 
(0.18) 
-0.50*** 
(0.16) 
0.08 
(0.19) 
0.24 
(0.17) 
0.05 
(0.12) 
0.41** 
(0.17) 
JPY 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
0.05 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.21 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.09) 
-0.13 
(0.08) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
0.27 
(0.21) 
-0.19 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.09 
(0.17) 
0.65*** 
(0.17) 
-0.22 
(0.21) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
-0.03 
(0.17) 
0.00 
(0.14) 
-0.19 
(0.21) 
CAD 
-0.11 
(0.09) 
0.18*** 
(0.06) 
0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.05) 
0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.08) 
0.06 
(0.08) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.05 
(0.08) 
-0.00 
(0.06) 
-0.48*** 
(0.16) 
-0.03 
(0.12) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
-0.10 
(0.09) 
0.06 
(0.07) 
0.37** 
(0.15) 
-0.18 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.14) 
0.23* 
(0.14) 
-0.02 
(0.12) 
CHF 
-0.15 
(0.10) 
0.16 
(0.12) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.09 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(0.13) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
-0.23** 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.07) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.24 
(0.18) 
-0.13 
(0.21) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.19) 
0.53*** 
(0.24) 
0.11 
(0.26) 
0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.23 
(0.21) 
0.11 
(0.14) 
-0.42** 
(0.20) 
NOK 
-0.21 
(0.12) 
0.20 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
0.17 
(0.10) 
0.10*** 
(0.00) 
0.21* 
(0.14) 
-0.36** 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.10 
(0.08) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.24) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.18) 
0.65*** 
(0.19) 
0.61*** 
(0.20) 
0.45* 
(0.25) 
0.06 
(0.23) 
-0.27 
(0.21) 
0.01 
(0.15) 
-0.44** 
(0.19) 
SEK 
-0.25 
(0.11) 
0.24** 
(0.11) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.10) 
0.29*** 
(0.09) 
0.18 
(0.14) 
-0.25** 
(0.10) 
-0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.20) 
-0.11 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.13 
(0.18) 
0.63*** 
(0.24) 
0.41* 
(0.26) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.34 
(0.19) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
-0.35* 
(0.20) 
AUD 
0.19* 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.01 
(0.16) 
-0.13 
(0.14) 
0.02 
(0.11) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
0.19* 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
0.34 
(0.31) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.28) 
-0.34 
(0.26) 
0.15 
(0.20) 
0.38** 
(0.18) 
-0.06 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
NZD 
0.15 
(0.12) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.11) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
-0.21 
(0.13) 
-0.07 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.10) 
-0.02 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.08) 
0.14 
(0.21) 
-0.12 
(0.19) 
0.46 
(0.31) 
0.13 
(0.20) 
0.13 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.36) 
-0.64** 
(0.24) 
0.22 
(0.21) 
0.14 
(0.18) 
0.20 
(0.21) 
0.31** 
(0.15) 
RUB 
-0.25 
(0.25) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
-0.06 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.30 
(0.19) 
0.02 
(0.10) 
-0.21 
(0.29) 
-0.17 
(0.22) 
0.01 
(0.08) 
0.05 
(0.05) 
0.00 
(0.63) 
-0.30 
(0.21) 
-0.24 
(0.47) 
-0.12 
(0.30) 
0.00 
(0.35) 
0.56** 
(0.19) 
0.14 
(0.26) 
0.12 
(0.72) 
0.01 
(0.55) 
-0.00 
（0.20） 
-0.09 
(0.14) 
ZAR 
-0.04 
(0.19) 
0.07 
(0.16) 
-0.04 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.10 
(0.16) 
0.01 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
0.21 
(0.16) 
-0.22 
(0.15) 
-0.08 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.11) 
-0.84** 
(0.35) 
0.30 
(0.30) 
0.20 
(0.21) 
0.23 
(0.19) 
0.53* 
(0.29) 
0.45*** 
(0.11) 
0.19 
(0.25) 
0.31 
(0.30) 
-0.38 
(0.28) 
0.08 
(0.27) 
-0.24 
(0.20) 
PLN 
-0.24 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
0.21* 
(0.11) 
-0.11 
(0.10) 
0.04 
(0.18) 
0.17* 
(0.09) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
0.05 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
0.03 
(0.14) 
-0.01 
(0.11) 
-0.45 
(0.35) 
-0.55 
(0.28) 
0.19 
(0.28) 
-0.35 
(0.25) 
0.81 
(0.46) 
0.33 
(0.25) 
0.23 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.34) 
-0.60** 
(0.30) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
-0.12 
(0.27) 
RON 
-0.06 
(1.08) 
-1.71 
(2.40) 
0.02 
(0.14) 
-0.29 
(0.70) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.08 
(0.08) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
0.04 
(0.17) 
0.02 
(0.32) 
0.04 
(0.20) 
-0.04 
(0.11) 
-2.87 
(1.84) 
-6.03 
(4.07) 
0.25 
(0.23) 
-2.60** 
(1.19) 
0.30 
(0.24) 
0.04 
(0.22) 
0.30 
(0.22) 
-0.41 
(0.32) 
-0.45 
(0.55) 
0.25 
(0.34) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
HUF 
-0.18 
(0.12) 
0.17 
(0.11) 
0.08 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.22 
(0.15) 
0.13 
(0.17) 
0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.00 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.11) 
-0.08 
(0.13) 
-0.17* 
(0.10) 
-0.44 
(0.31) 
-0.40 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.31) 
0.05 
(0.25) 
0.70* 
(0.39) 
-0.03 
(0.38) 
0.66** 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.32) 
-1.03** 
(0.27) 
-0.00 
(0.34) 
-0.14 
(0.24) 
CZK 
-0.12 
(0.12) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.17 
(0.12) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.24** 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.14) 
-0.04 
(0.10) 
-0.06 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
-0.11 
(0.11) 
-0.60** 
(0.31) 
0.29 
(0.39) 
0.12 
(0.30) 
-0.18 
(0.26) 
0.62* 
(0.33) 
0.84*** 
(0.13) 
-0.06 
(0.34) 
0.04 
(0.26) 
-0.94*** 
(0.26) 
0.14 
(0.35) 
-0.29 
(0.30) 
CLP 
0.08 
(0.11) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.07 
(0.13) 
0.08 
(0.10) 
-0.01 
(0.10) 
0.13 
(0.18) 
-0.07 
(0.08) 
-0.13 
(0.11) 
-0.09* 
(0.05) 
-0.02 
(0.09) 
0.09 
(0.08) 
-0.50** 
(0.21) 
0.29 
(0.39) 
0.16 
(0.25) 
-0.18 
(0.18) 
-0.01 
(0.17) 
-0.43* 
(0.24) 
0.50*** 
(0.15) 
-0.02 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.10) 
0.19 
(0.16) 
0.04 
(0.15) 
INR 
-0.04 
(0.04) 
0.08** 
(0.04) 
0.09 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.04) 
-0.02 
(0.04) 
-0.05 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.03) 
0.06* 
(0.04) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.07 
(0.06) 
-0.06 
(0.05) 
-0.11* 
(0.07) 
-0.13 
(0.07) 
-0.03 
(0.07) 
-0.10 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.08) 
-0.09** 
(0.04) 
0.06 
(0.06) 
0.00 
(0.07) 
0.03 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.11) 
-0.14 
(0.10) 
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Table 9 (cont.). Responses of exchange rates to the Fed’s monetary policy change in an 11-day event window 
Note: the code***denote significance level of α<0.01;**α<0.05;*α<0.10. 
Table 10. Responses of equity and commodity prices to the Fed’s monetary policy change in an 11-day event window 
Treasuries 
Expected policy effect Unexpected policy effect 
Event days Event days 
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
S&P 500 -0.23 -0.17 0.11 0.26* 0.33 -0.03 0.33 0.17 -0.38 0.10 0.11 0.62* 0.13 0.27 -0.05 -0.72 0.28 -0.72 -0.65* -0.01 -0.43 -0.19 
FTSE 100 
-0.23 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.19) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
0.50 
(0.38) 
0.43** 
(0.20) 
-0.11 
(0.20) 
0.43** 
(0.20) 
0.02 
(0.19) 
-0.16 
(0.23) 
0.19 
(0.23) 
0.08 
(0.23) 
0.66** 
(0.31) 
0.67* 
(0.34) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
0.40 
(0.67) 
0.56 
(0.38) 
-0.24 
(0.40) 
0.55* 
(0.38) 
-0.36 
(0.34) 
0.01 
(0.40) 
-0.66 
(0.40) 
-0.15 
(0.39) 
DAX 
0.09 
(0.23) 
-0.43 
(0.27) 
-0.14 
(0.20) 
0.21 
(0.25) 
0.34 
(0.33) 
-0.06 
(0.19) 
0.34 
(0.33) 
0.13 
(0.25) 
-0.07 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.12 
(0.25) 
0.43 
(0.41) 
0.64 
(0.49) 
0.31 
(0.38) 
-0.32 
(0.46) 
0.43 
(0.61) 
-0.09 
(0.42) 
0.43 
(0.61) 
0.38 
(0.46) 
0.25 
(0.56) 
-0.67 
(0.42) 
-0.46 
(0.44) 
Hang 
Seng 
-0.32 
(0.29) 
-
0.65** 
(0.29) 
0.10 
(0.36) 
0.50 
(0.38) 
-0.00 
(0.36) 
0.15 
(0.88) 
-0.00 
(0.36) 
-0.54 
(0.42) 
0.21 
(0.33) 
0.18 
(0.25) 
0.04 
(0.29) 
0.26 
(0.51) 
0.73 
(0.52) 
0.59 
(0.66) 
0.40 
(0.67) 
-0.47 
(0.66) 
0.77 
(0.97) 
-0.47 
(0.66) 
-2.84*** 
(0.75) 
-1.04 
(0.57) 
0.67 
(0.43) 
-0.66 
(0.48) 
Nikkei 
225 
-0.03 
(0.28) 
-0.21 
(0.24) 
-0.06 
(0.32) 
0.90*** 
(0.26) 
-0.14 
(0.32) 
0.21 
(0.21) 
-0.14 
(0.32) 
-0.34 
(0.31) 
0.15 
(0.26) 
-0.45 
(0.35) 
-0.34 
(0.29) 
-0.27 
(0.55) 
0.43 
(0.43) 
1.42** 
(0.57) 
0.21 
(0.46) 
-0.08 
(0.57) 
0.62* 
(0.36) 
-0.08 
(0.57) 
-1.54** 
(0.56) 
-0.52 
(0.49) 
-0.25 
(0.64) 
-0.23 
(0.51) 
Ibovespa 
0.60 
(0.86) 
-0.38 
(0.49) 
-0.19 
(0.57) 
0.15 
(0.58) 
0.55 
(0.43) 
-0.57 
(0.61) 
0.55 
(0.43) 
0.67 
(0.52) 
-0.87 
(0.92) 
-0.69 
(0.55) 
-0.26 
(0.91) 
1.35 
(1.56) 
1.52* 
(0.86) 
1.61 
(1.01) 
-
2.91** 
(1.04) 
0.10 
(0.78) 
-1.42 
(3.29) 
0.10 
(0.76) 
0.42 
(1.01) 
-2.65 
(1.71) 
-1.69 
(1.04) 
1.77 
(1.66) 
Gold 
Price 
0.15 
(0.15) 
-0.14 
(0.18) 
-
0.23* 
(0.12) 
-0.19 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
-0.14 
(0.14) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
0.23 
(0.16) 
-0.06 
(0.12) 
-0.09 
(0.15) 
-0.04 
(0.15) 
0.40 
(0.27) 
-0.15 
(0.33) 
0.30 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.26) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.47* 
(0.05) 
-0.01 
(0.29) 
-0.64** 
(0.29) 
0.44** 
(0.22) 
-0.48* 
(0.27) 
0.30 
(0.28) 
WTI 
Crude 
0.89* 
(0.46) 
-0.59* 
(0.34) 
-0.49 
(0.38) 
0.33 
(0.49) 
0.87** 
(0.36) 
-0.02 
(0.37) 
0.87** 
(0.36) 
1.09*** 
(0.36) 
0.01 
(0.47) 
-1.50*** 
(0.50) 
0.26 
(0.47) 
1.92** 
(0.85) 
0.15 
(0.62) 
-0.34 
(0.72) 
1.00 
(0.92) 
-0.20 
(0.74) 
0.27 
(0.91) 
-0.20 
(0.74) 
0.74 
(0.69) 
-0.08 
(0.82) 
-0.03 
(0.86) 
1.03 
(0.86) 
Notice: the code***denote significance level of α<0.01; **α<0.05; * α<0.10. 
Currencies 
Expected policy effect Unexpected policy effect 
Event days Event days 
 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
MXN 
0.00 
（0.01） 
0.14 
(0.15) 
-3.83 
(13.10) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
-0.01*** 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
0.29 
(0.39) 
-18.98 
(24.02) 
0.02*** 
(0.01) 
0.01 
(0.01) 
0.01* 
(0.00) 
-0.00 
(0.02) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
0.02 
(0.02) 
-0.01 
(0.02) 
0.02** 
(0.01) 
BRL 
0.02 
(0.18) 
0.14 
(0.15) 
0.39** 
(0.15) 
-0.17 
(0.21） 
0.03 
(0.16) 
-0.23 
(0.17) 
-0.05 
(0.16) 
-0.01 
(0.20) 
0.16 
（0.13） 
-0.14 
(0.17) 
0.20 
(0.18) 
-0.76* 
(0.43) 
0.29 
(0.39) 
0.36 
(0.36) 
-0.20 
(0.50) 
0.55 
(0.37) 
-0.27 
(0.75) 
0.17 
(0.37) 
-0.73 
(0.46) 
-0.47 
（0.29） 
-0.22 
(0.40) 
0.22 
(0.41) 
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